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CHARTER	 OUTSCORES	 HOCKEY	 
AS	 MOST	 IMPORTANT	 NATIONAL	 
SYMBOL
According  to a  report recently released by Statistics 
Canada, Canadians ranked the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as the top  national symbol (93%). The 
Canadian flag  was second at 91%, followed by the 
national anthem (88%), the RCMP (87%)  and 
hockey at 77%. Other highlights to the survey 
included:
• Residents of Newfoundland and Labrador were
the most likely Canadians to feel that national
symbols were important while  Quebecers were
the least likely.
• Immigrants were more likely than non-
immigrants to believe national symbols were
very important to national identity.
• The Charter  was the  most important symbol
among university-educated Canadians.
• Women were generally more likely than men to
perceive national symbols as very important to
the Canadian identity.
• 58% of women thought the RCMP was a very
important national symbol compared to 52% of
men.
• The overwhelming  majority  of people (92%)
believed Canadians collectively shared the
value of “respect for the law”.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Canadian Identity, 2013”, Catalogue no. 
89-652-X2015005, released on October 1, 2015. 
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Upcoming Courses
Advanced	 Police	 Training
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC	 Police	 Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Deep diversity: overcoming us vs. them.
Shakil Choudhury.
Toronto, ON: Between the Lines, 2015.
BF 575 P9 C46 2015
Every officer is a leader:  coaching  leadership, 
learning, and performance in justice, public 
safety, and security organizations.
foreword by Beverley Busson; co-authors, Terry D. 
Anderson, Kenneth Gisborne, Patrick Holliday.
Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2012.
HV 7935 A53 2012
Everything is workable: a Zen approach to 
conflict resolution.
Diane Musho Hamilton.
Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2013.
BQ 4570 C588 H36 2013
Growing  into resilience: sexual  and gender 
minority youth in Canada.
André P. Grace with Kristopher Wells.
Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
HQ 73.3 C3 G73 2015
Handbook of practical program evaluation.
edited by Kathryn E. Newcomer, Harry P. Hatry, 
Joseph S. Wholey.
Hoboken, NJ: Jossey-Bass, 2015.
H 97 H358 2015
Leading  with cultural intelligence: the real secret 
to success.
David Livermore.
New York, NY: AMA, 2015.
HD 57.7 L589 2015
The managed heart: commercialization of human 
feeling.
Arlie Russell Hochschild.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012.
BF 531 H62 2012
The mindful way through stress: the proven 8-
week path to health, happiness, and well-being.
Shamash Alidina.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2015.
RA 785 A43 2015
Mindful work: how meditation is changing 
business from the inside out.
David Gelles.
Boston, MA: An Eamon Dolan Book, Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2015.
BF 637 M4 G447 2015
S.U.M.O (Shut up, move on): the straight-talking 
guide to succeeding in life.
Paul McGee.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015.
BF 637 S4 M392 2015
SAS survival  handbook:  the definitive survival 
guide.
John 'Lofty' Wiseman.
London: William Collins, 2014.
GV 200.5 W584 2014
Strength training past 50.
Wayne L. Westcott, Thomas R. Baechle.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2015.
GV 546 W47 2015
World drug report.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Geneva: United Nations.
HV 5801 W73
Your first leadership job: how catalyst leaders 
bring out the best in others.
Tacy M. Byham and Richard S. Wellins.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015.
HD 57.7 B94 2015
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ID	 REQUEST	 NOT	 NECESSARILY	 
A	 DETENTION
R. v. Poole, 2015 BCCA 464
The accused was seen by two police 
officers walk across the street at 3:00 
am in a  downtown area. The officers 
made a U-turn in their police car and 
pulled up alongside him. They rolled 
their window down and began to speak to the 
accused. He was asked his name, where he was 
going, and where he  was coming  from. He provided 
his name and identification, which was run through 
CPIC. An outstanding  arrest warrant was discovered. 
He was arrested and a cursory search was 
conducted. Police found a loaded, fully cocked 
handgun concealed in his pants.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued that he was arbitrary 
detained under s.  9 of the Charter when 
he was initially  stopped. He further 
submitted that he was not immediately 
informed of the reasons for his detention or of his 
right to counsel contrary to ss. 10(a) and (b). Since 
the detention was arbitrary, he contended that 
searching him and seizing the gun breached s. 8. 
The trial judge disagreed. He found that the accused 
was not detained when initially stopped by the 
police but prior to the arrest warrant being 
discovered and executed. He accepted the evidence 
of the  officers over that of the accused. The officers 
testified that their conversation with the  accused 
began spontaneously without any verbal cues from 
either officer when the cruiser window was rolled 
down. A casual chat followed in which the accused 
was cooperative and forthcoming. He offered up 
identification and eventually his criminal past. The 
encounter was brief, friendly, and would not lead 
the casual observer to conclude that the accused 
was being  detained. The accused was in his 40s, 
large  in stature, and had a high degree of 
sophistication when it came to the police. He had 
extensive dealings with the police over the past 20 
years or more. The judge stated: 
Here, the actions of the police were not in the 
nature of a focussed investigation as the term is 
understood in Grant, nor was there anything in 
the actions of the police which can be 
considered either oppressive, either in language 
or deed, such as to cause a reasonable person in 
the situation of the accused to conclude that he 
had no option but to remain. The encounter was 
short, approximately five minutes from the initial 
contact to his arrest. In that brief period, there 
was no command by the officers which could 
have reasonably led the accused to conclude he 
was not able to keep walking  or that he was 
obliged to answer the posed questions.
To conclude otherwise would be to invite the 
conclusion that every encounter, regardless of 
how benign and non-intrusive, gives rise to an 
obligation on the part of the state to advise that 
person they are free to go or alternatively 
provide them with the mandated warning of the 
right to counsel. Such, in my view, is not the 
law. [paras. 70-71, 2014 BCSC 1308]
There was no detention and the evidence was 
admissible. The accused was convicted of possessing 
a firearm dangerous to the public peace, carrying  a 
concealed weapon, and possessing  a restricted 
firearm without a licence or authorization.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appea led h i s 
convictions arguing, among  other 
things, that the trial judge erred in 
concluding  that a detention did 
not occur before the arrest warrant was executed. 
In the accused’s view, a pedestrian has an 
expectation of complete freedom of movement 
unless a crime is occurring  or police are  conducting 
an investigation. He suggested that a pedestrian who 
is stopped by police as part of general policing 
“[A] brief encounter involving police questioning and a request for identification do not 
necessarily amount to a detention.”
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duties  will always be detained. But Justice Fenlon, 
writing  the Appeal Court’s judgment, disagreed. “A 
brief encounter involving  police questioning  and a 
request for identification do not necessarily amount 
to a detention.” She further stated:
In my view this proposition is not supported by 
the case law. A random stop of a pedestrian 
absent an investigation or crime may more 
readily lead to an inference of psychological 
compulsion, but that does not mean that every 
such stop amounts to a detention. [para. 56]
As for the facts in this case, the trial judge applied 
the correct test in determining  whether or not a 
detention occurred:
In the present case, based on the trial judge’s 
findings, there was no physical restraint or legal 
obligation on [the accused] to comply with the 
police officer’s request for his name. The officer 
was making  general inquiries, not singling [the 
accused] out for focused interrogation. The 
officers did not initially get out of their vehicle or 
impede [the accused’s] travel, and the encounter 
was brief. [The accused] was 45 years old at the 
time, much larger in stature than either police 
officer, and had considerable past experience 
with police. [para. 62]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
What did the accused say?
The accused testified he was directed to stop, told 
not to move when he requested to do so, asked to 
explain the contents of his backpack and gave it to 
the police. The trial judge, however, did not believe 
him.
Note-able	 Quote
“The quality of a person’s life is in direct 
proportion to their commitment to excellence, 
regardless of the chosen profession.” - Vince 
Lombardi
“A random stop of a pedestrian absent 
an investigation or crime may more 
readily lead to an inference of 
psychological compulsion, but that does 
not mean that every such stop amounts 
to a detention.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Detention
“In cases where there is no physical 
restraint or legal obligation, it may 
not be clear whether a person has 
been detained. To determine 
whether the reasonable person in the individual's 
circumstances would conclude that he or she had 
been deprived by the state of the liberty of choice, the 
court may consider, inter alia, the following factors:
a. The circumstances giving rise to the encounter as 
would reasonably be perceived by the individual: 
whether the police were providing general 
assistance; maintaining general order; making 
general inquiries regarding a particular 
occurrence; or, singling out the individual for 
focussed investigation.
b. The nature of the police conduct, including the 
language used; the use of physical contact; the 
place where the interaction occurred; the presence 
of others; and the duration of the encounter.
c. The particular characteristics or circumstances of 
the individual where relevant, including age; 
physical stature; minority status; level of 
sophistication.” 
Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice McLachlin in R. v. Grant, 
2009 SCC 32 at para. 44.  
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FLIGHT	 FROM	 POLICE	 PART	 OF	 
CONSTELLATION	 OF	 GROUNDS
R. v. Bourque, 2015 NBCA 68 
 
At about 12:30 pm a complainant 
reported to police that her adult drug 
addicted son, who lived with her, 
had stolen about $50 from her purse 
that morning  and she wanted him 
evicted from her home. Two police officers attended, 
met with the son, and confronted him with the theft 
complaint and drug  addiction allegation. He 
admitted to the theft and acknowledged that he had 
“a drug  problem.” He told the police that he buys 
his drugs from someone named “Pete” in the 
“Elmwood Drive area.” The son eventually 
consented to leaving  his mother’s residence and he 
was driven to a friend’s home by one of the officers.
 
The mother subsequently told the second officer the 
following:
• She was aware of facts that, in her opinion, 
demonstrated her son was a regular drug user; 
• She believed him to be a drug addict; 
• She was convinced he stole the money from her 
wallet in order to procure drugs; 
• She checked her cell phone and understood from 
the text messages received and sent by her son that 
an imminent drug  sale/purchase transaction was 
scheduled in the vicinity of the McDonald’s 
restaurant on Morton Avenue; and
• She provided the following  description of the 
individual supplying drugs to her son: a short, slim 
or skinny, bald man.
 
As a result of this information, the officer formed the 
belief that an indictable offence (drug  trafficking) 
was about to be committed in the vicinity of the 
McDonald’s restaurant on Morton Avenue. He 
immediately proceeded to the area where he saw 
the accused on the sidewalk. He matched the 
description provided by the complainant and was 
the only person at the scene matching  the 
description. After the officer parked his marked 
police vehicle a  few feet from the accused and 
began to get out, the accused looked at him, turned 
around, and made his way towards the McDonald’s 
drive-through area. The officer ordered him to halt. 
He said, “Stop, you’re under arrest,” but the accused 
ran away. The officer caught him, threw him to the 
ground and arrested him. When he was searched, 
the police found several items of evidence including 
a marijuana joint, a cell phone, hydromorphone 
pills, a knife, banknotes hidden in his socks, and 
bundles of banknotes (totalling  several thousand 
dollars) hidden under his clothing  and taped to his 
wa i s t . He was cha rged wi th pos se s s ing 
hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking.
 
New Brunswick Provincial Court
 
The judge found the accused’s arrest was 
unlawful under s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code  because it was not based 
upon reasonable grounds. “I am not 
persuaded that the peace officer had reasonable  and 
probable grounds to believe that this specific 
individual was about to commit an offence,” he said. 
“In my view, the circumstances of his arrest were not 
sufficient to conclude the arrest was lawful.” Since 
the arrest was unlawful, the accused’s s. 9 Charter 
rights were breached and the search that followed 
was unreasonable under s. 8. The evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted. 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
Th e C r o w n a p p e a l e d t h e 
accused’s acquittal because, in its 
view, the trial judge erred in 
finding  that the accused’s Charter 
rights were infringed and that the evidence ought to 
be excluded. Chief Justice Drapeau, speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal, agreed with the Crown that the trial 
judge erred in determining  whether reasonable 
grounds for the arrest existed:
 
In most instances, the prosecution’s case on the 
issue of arrest lawfulness is based upon a 
conste l la t ion of c i rcumstances which, 
individually, may be of little or no probative 
value, but whose cumulative effect demonstrates 
the existence of the reasonable grounds required 
under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. In this 
case, however, the judge assessed the probative 
value of each individual and isolated 
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circumstance relied upon by the prosecution in 
support of its contention that the arrest was 
based on reasonable grounds. This approach has 
been unanimously rejected by appellate courts, 
all of which favour an assessment of the 
probative value of the cumulative effect of the 
relevant circumstances. Had he applied this 
analytical framework, the judge might have 
found the grounds required to clothe the 
[accused’s] arrest with the mantle of lawfulness 
did exist. In this regard, it is important to 
remember that where there is no submission by 
the individual targeted, i.e. the person informed 
by a peace officer he or she is under arrest, the 
“arrest” occurs only once a peace officer seizes 
the person or touches him or her with a view to 
detention. It follows that the bundle of 
justificatory grounds for the [accused’s] 
warrantless arrest include his attempt to escape 
from [the officer]. [references omitted, para. 11]
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
s.	 10(b)	 RIGHT	 UNAFFECTED	 BY	 
BREATH	 SAMPLE	 CONDITION	 IN	 
RECOGNIZANCE
R. v. Sabados, 2015 SKCA 74                   
The accused was released on a 
recognizance of bail for robbery, 
possessing  a weapon for a dangerous 
purpose, and resisting  arrest. He 
agreed to the conditions of his release 
which included the following: 
(i) “provide suitable samples of … breath  for 
testing upon the request of a Police Officer who 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that you are 
in  breach of a condition of this order regarding 
the consumption of alcohol”; and 
(ii) “not to possess or consume alcohol or drugs 
that have not been  prescribed for you by a 
medical doctor and not enter or be in any place 
in  which  the main  purpose is the sale of alcohol, 
such as bars or liquor stores.” 
About two (2) months later he was arrested for 
several new offences resulting  from a threatening 
incident where he brandished a knife and made 
stabbing  motions with it. He was advised he had the 
right to consult counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter. 
He said he wanted to retain counsel and a phone 
call was placed to a lawyer. However, he was 
unable to contact the lawyer, so he left a  message. 
He was taken to an interview room where he gave a 
statement regarding  the alleged stabbing  incident. 
The officer then detected a  lingering  smell of 
alcohol. A demand for a  breath sample was made 
which the accused initially agreed to provide. 
However, he  was not advised a  second time of his 
right to retain counsel respecting  the potential 
charge that could result from failing  to provide a 
breath sample. He changed his mind about 
providing  a  breath sample, said he wanted to talk  to 
his lawyer, and ran into a cell and remained there. 
He was charged with threatening  to cause death and 
assault with a weapon for the knife incident as well 
as three (3)  counts of breaching  his recognizance: 
failing  to keep  the peace and be of good behaviour, 
consuming  or possessing  alcohol or drugs, and 
failing to supply a breath sample. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused was acquitted of the charges 
related to the threatening  incident. As for 
breaching  his recognizance, he was 
convicted of consuming  alcohol or drugs 
and failing  to provide a breath sample. The judge 
rejected the accused’s argument that he should have 
also been acquitted on the charge of failing  to 
provide a breath sample because he had not been 
given the right to consult counsel under s. 10(b) of 
the Charter. In the judge’s opinion, the accused’s 
“[T]he prosecution’s case on the issue 
of arrest lawfulness is based upon a 
constellation of circumstances which, 
individually, may be of little or no 
probative value, but whose cumulative 
effect demonstrates the existence of 
the reasonable grounds required under 
s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.”
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right to counsel was altered when he agreed to the 
condition of his release that he would submit to a 
breath sample. “[The accused] cannot attempt to set 
up  his Charter rights as if they had been unaltered in 
defence to the demand made by the police officer 
pursuant to the  court order,” said the judge. “In other 
words, [the bail review judge] altered those rights 
and made it unconditional that he provide the 
breath sample. [The accused] was obligated to 
comply and did not.” The officer had a reasonable 
suspicion of a  breach and properly made the  breath 
demand. The accused went into his cell, said “Lock 
me up,” and wouldn’t provide a sample. This was an 
immediate, clear, and unequivocal refusal. As well, 
the accused did not have a reasonable excuse for 
refusing  to comply with the demand for a  breath 
sample until he consulted with counsel. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused challenged only  his 
conviction related to breaching  his 
recognizance by failing  to supply a 
breath sample on the demand of a 
peace officer. In his view, he had the right to be 
informed of his right to counsel and to retain and 
instruct counsel under s.  10(b) of the Charter even 
though he agreed in the recognizance to provide a 
breath sample upon the request of a police officer 
who had grounds to suspect he had breached his 
recognizance by consuming  alcohol. In his opinion, 
s.  10(b)  applies to everyone – including  people  on 
release conditions –  and therefore he had the right 
upon arrest or detention to be informed of the right 
to retain and instruct counsel and to do so.
The Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
accused, by agreeing  to the terms of his 
recognizance, did not have a right to be informed of 
his right to counsel. He did not have a right to retain 
and instruct counsel under s. 10(b)  in the 
circumstances where a police  officer had reasonable 
grounds to suspect that he had breached the term of 
his recognizance regarding  the consumption of 
alcohol or drugs and demanded a  breath sample. In 
the Crown’s view, “by consenting  to the search in 
advance, [the accused] waived his right to attack the 
validity of the search conducted in strict accordance 
with the terms of the order.”
s. 10(b) Charter
Justice Whitmore, authoring  the  Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, described the right to counsel as follows:
The right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter 
is engaged whenever an individual is arrested or 
detained, regardless of the reason for that arrest 
or detention or the possible evidence that could 
be produced as a result of that arrest or 
detention. [para. 20]
In the circumstances of this case, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that an accused, by entering  into 
a recognizance that contains a clause that they will 
provide a breath sample, by that fact alone, did not 
give up their s.  10(b) rights. Justice Whitmore also 
refused to read words into the  recognizance such 
that the bail review judge had ordered the accused 
provide a breath sample without the benefit of s. 10
(b). The accused’s right to counsel was unaffected by 
the term of the recognizance:
... s. 10(b) is different than other Charter rights. It 
rests on the premise that legal advice is a 
necessary prerequisite before one is required to 
incriminate oneself.
A police officer who has reasonable grounds to 
suspect an operator of a vehicle has consumed 
alcohol may demand a breath sample from the 
driver pursuant to s.  254(2) of the Criminal 
Code, yet the driver upon being detained by the 
police officer has the right to retain and instruct 
counsel. The Criminal Code is clear on the right 
to make the demand, but the driver’s s.  10(b) 
“The right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter is engaged whenever an individual is 
arrested or detained, regardless of the reason for that arrest or detention or the possible 
evidence that could be produced as a result of that arrest or detention.” 
Arrest or detention 
10.  Everyone has the right on arrest or detention …
(b)  to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to 
be informed of that right ….
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right is not affected. There is no argument before 
me that persuades me the recognizance should 
be treated differently than the provisions of the 
Criminal Code. [paras. 35-36]
Nor did the accused waive his right to counsel. He 
was initially informed of his right to counsel and was 
given an opportunity to call a  lawyer. After 
unsuccessfully attempting  to contact his lawyer, he 
agreed to give a  statement and to provide a breath 
sample. However, he almost immediately thereafter 
changed his mind and said he wanted to speak with 
his lawyer. But he was not given another opportunity 
to do so:
The Crown is required to prove that [the 
accused] waived his right to counsel. It has not 
done so. Section 10 applies whenever a person 
is arrested or detained regardless of the reasons 
for that arrest or detention. [The accused] was 
arrested. He therefore had a s.  10(b) right to 
consult with counsel. The police had an 
obligation to refrain from eliciting  evidence from 
him until he had a reasonable opportunity to 
consult with counsel. [The accused] was initially 
unsuccessful in contacting his counsel. Even 
though he then agreed to give a statement and a 
sample, he subsequently re-asserted his request 
for counsel. This does not amount to an 
unequivocal waiver as required by Prosper: his 
right to counsel was thus breached. He never 
had an opportunity to consult with counsel. The 
trial judge was in error in finding that [the 
accused’s] right to counsel was not breached. 
[para. 45]
Since the  accused’s s. 10(b)  Charter right had been 
breached, a s. 24(2) analysis was necessary.
Admissibility of the Evidence: s. 24(2)
In this case, the Court of Appeal found there was a 
sufficient temporal link  between the s. 10(b) breach 
and the production of the evidence of refusing  to 
provide a breath sample such that s. 24(2) was 
triggered. 
• Seriousness of the Charter-infringing 
state conduct: SERIOUS. Even 
assuming  the police acted in good 
faith, the impact on the administration 
of justice would be negative. “This is 
part icularly so because  [ the accused] 
specifically  requested counsel and was charged 
because  he  would not submit to the breath test 
until he talked to his lawyer,” said Justice 
Whitmore. “The police attempted to obtain 
bodily evidence from him without providing 
him with an opportunity to talk  to his counsel 
after he re-asserted his request for counsel. It 
was his insistence on exercising  his right that led 
directly to the charge.” 
• Impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused: SERIOUS. 
Because the accused insisted upon his right to 
counsel , he was charged wi th 
breaching  his recognizance over and 
above the  charge of breaching  his 
r ecogn izance by consuming  o r 
possessing alcohol or drugs. 
• Society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits. The evidence of the refusal 
to provide a breath sample was reliable 
evidence of him breaching  a bail term. 
This was crucial to the refusal charge 
and therefore weighed against the 
exclusion of the evidence.
In considering  all of the factors, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that admitting  the evidence would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The evidence was excluded, the accused’s appeal 
was allowed and an acquittal on the charge of 
breaching  his recognizance by failing  to supply a 
breath sample on demand of a peace officer was 
entered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able	 Quote
“The way a team plays as a whole determines its 
success. You may have the greatest bunch of 
individual stars in the world, but if they don’t play 
together, the club won’t be worth a dime.” - Babe 
Ruth
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RELIABLE	 INFO	 REQUIRES	 LESS	 
CORROBORATION	 
R. v. Zettler, 2015 ONCA 613
A police officer received five 
different tips over a period of one 
month from a confidential informer. 
The informer said he had received his 
information from a  participant in drug 
trafficking. This informant had previously provided 
information for two search warrants resulting  in 
convictions and information leading  to four street 
arrests, each resulting  in convictions. As well, the 
informer had provided information regarding 
packaging  and pricing  of drugs. The informer had 
never provided information that was later found to 
be false  or misleading. As well, the informer was a 
drug  user, had a criminal record and was paid for 
the tips. The police officer handling  the informant 
passed on this information to another officer who 
acted on it.
The final tip  was received at 10:30 am on the day of 
the accused’s arrest. This tip  reported that the 
accused, a 25-year-old living  outside Toronto, would 
be driving  to Sudbury in a few hours with a large 
quantity  of “oxys” and cocaine to distribute  to 
dealers. He would be travelling  in either a black 
Mazda or a  grey Cadillac, bearing  plate numbers as 
provided, by way of Highway 69 and that he would 
likely be alone in the vehicle.  The tip  further 
conveyed that he had the same connections as his 
father who had been caught earlier that year and 
who was known to both officers. In addition to the 
tips, police did some independent research to 
corroborate the ownership  of cars registered to the 
accused as well as his address. Police confirmed that 
the accused owned two cars as described and was 
25 years of age.  Police set up an observation 
position on Highway 69 just south of Sudbury.  The 
accused was first observed driving  alone, 
northbound in a grey Cadillac at 1:54 pm and was 
stopped at about 2:00 pm on the highway. The 
accused was arrested and his vehicle was searched. 
Police found 360 grams of cocaine packaged in 
three  separate bags and one thousand 80 mg 
oxycodone tablets in a clear plastic ziploc bag. 
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused brought a motion for the 
exclusion of the evidence. He challenged 
the warrantless search as unreasonable 
because  it was conducted as an incident 
to an unlawful arrest for lack  of reasonable grounds. 
He suggested that the arrest was grounded entirely 
on information provided by an informant that was 
not credible, compelling, or corroborated.
The judge, however, found that the confidential 
informer was reliable on the basis of the  handler’s 
past dealings with and knowledge of him. In the 
judge’s opinion the police had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the accused was about to commit an 
indictable of fence on the  total i ty of the 
circumstances:   
 
The arresting  officer must have subjective and 
objective reasonable and probable grounds on 
which to base an arrest. When the police action 
is grounded on a tip from a confidential 
informant, the court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances including whether the 
information was compelling, whether the 
information came from a credible source and 
whether the information was corroborated. 
[para. 12, 2013 ONSC 6703]
And further:
The source had provided a number of details 
regarding  the transport of the drugs by [the 
accused]; on a specific date, at a specific time, 
and on a specific route into Sudbury. [The 
investigating officer] had independently 
corroborated details with respect to vehicle 
ownership, address and age of [the accused] as 
he had received the information from [the 
informer’s handler].  [The investigating  officer] 
testified that he also took into consideration the 
past proven reliability of the source, as conveyed 
to him directly from an experienced drug officer 
who was the handler of this confidential 
informant and with whom [the investigating 
officer] had worked in the past.  As a result, I am 
satisfied that it was objectively reasonable to rely 
on the confidential informant’s tip that [the 
accused] would have cocaine and oxycodone in 
that car. [para. 22, 2013 ONSC 6703]
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The arrest was lawful in the circumstances and, 
therefore, the search incident to arrest was 
reasonable. The evidence was ruled admissible and 
the accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine 
and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appea led h i s 
convictions arguing  that the 
informer’s tip that triggered the 
search was his fifth tip relating  to 
the accused and potential drug  activity in Sudbury. 
Since the first four tips did not result in the accused’s 
apprehension, the fifth tip  required more scrutiny by 
the police and efforts to corroborate at least some of 
the facts contained in the tip should have been 
enhanced.
The Court of Appeal, however, rejected this 
submission:
The police conducted CPIC, RMS and M.T.O. 
checks in relation to the previous tips and 
received a good deal of information about the 
[accused], vehicles and locations. The fact that 
this information did not lead to contact with the 
[accused] on previous occasions is, in our view, 
neutral. It does not establish that the [accused] 
did or did not engage in drug activities on those 
occasions.
Importantly, the trial judge was entitled to find 
that the informant’s past reliability weighed in 
favour of his credibility relating to the triggering 
tip in this case. Tips from proven reliable 
informants require less corroboration than tips 
from anonymous sources or an untried 
informant. 
The simple reality in this case is that the 
confidential informant appears to have been top 
notch. He had worked with the Sudbury police 
officer for several years and had provided 
information on several occasions leading  to 
several arrests. He was motivated to tell the truth 
(he was paid only if his information was 
accurate and led to criminal proceedings). In this 
case, he provided quite specific information – 
name of drug courier, car, drugs involved, date, 
time and location. The police were able to 
corroborate much of this information before the 
arrest. [paras. 6-8]
The trial judge applied the correct legal test, 
considered the relevant factors, and was justified in 
determining  that the arrest was both subjectively and 
objectively reasonable. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Zettler, 2013 ONSC 6703.
ADMISSION	 OF	 ALCOHOL	 
CONSUMPTION	 SATISFIED	 ASD	 
REASONABLE	 SUSPICION
R. v. Sword, 2015 SKCA 116
 
Just before 2:00 am a police officer 
observed a vehicle rapidly  leave the 
parking  lot of a bar and lounge. The 
officer followed the  vehicle, saw it 
cross the centre line and then pulled 
it over to check the driver’s sobriety. The accused 
was driving  and he had a passenger with him. The 
officer could smell an odour of alcohol coming  from 
the vehicle  but could not tell who it was coming 
from. When asked., the accused said he had been 
drinking. A roadside (ASD) demand was made and 
the accused blew an “F’, meaning  his blood alcohol 
was over 100 mg%. He was then arrested for 
impaired driving  and over 80 mg%, read his rights 
under the Charter and was given the breath demand. 
He subsequently provided two breath samples 
resulting  in readings of 150 mg% and 130 mg%. He 
was charged with impaired driving  and operating  a 
vehicle with a BAC in excess of 80 mg%. 
 
“The simple reality in this case is that 
the confidential informant appears to 
have been top notch.” 
“Tips from proven reliable informants 
require less corroboration than tips 
from anonymous sources or an untried 
informant.”
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Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The impaired charge was stayed by 
Crown but the over 80 mg% charge 
proceeded. The accused argued he was 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the 
Charter because the officer did not have sufficient 
grounds to demand an ASD sample. The judge 
agreed with the accused because he found the 
officer was “unable to say at what point in their 
interaction the accused told him the timing  of his 
last drink.” Even though the accused said he 
consumed alcohol, in the judge’s view the Crown 
was unable to prove that the officer had any basis for 
believing  that the accused had any alcohol in his 
body at the time the ASD demand was made. Based 
on the evidence, it was uncertain as to when the 
statement of recent consumption was made; it could 
have been made before the ASD demand, before  the 
ASD test, or after the ASD test. The Certificate  of 
Analysis was excluded and the accused was 
acquitted of driving while over 80 mg%. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal arguing, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in finding  that the officer did 
not have an objectively supported 
“reasonable suspicion” to make the roadside 
demand. The appeal judge found that the trial judge 
used the wrong  test to determine whether the police 
officer had the right to demand a sample of the 
accused’s breath. Rather than determining  whether 
the police officer had reasonable grounds to suspect 
the accused had consumed alcohol, the appeal 
judge found the trial judge applied a test that 
required the officer to believe the accused actually 
had alcohol in his body. “Specific  evidence that the 
accused had alcohol in his body is not required, nor 
must the constable have believed the accused had 
alcohol in his body,” said the appeal judge. “What is 
required is reasonable grounds to suspect the 
accused had alcohol in his body. This is not a 
pedantic distinction.” The accused’s acquittal was 
overturned and a conviction was entered. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the appeal 
judge’s decision to overturn his 
acquittal and enter a conviction. 
Justice Whitmore, speaking  for an 
unanimous Court of Appeal, found the trial judge 
did articulate the proper legal test of reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the accused had alcohol in 
his body. Although he referred to a belief that the 
accused had alcohol in his body, he nevertheless 
stated that the officer must “have reasonable grounds 
to suspect that the accused has alcohol in his body 
while operating  the vehicle before he is entitled to 
make the demand.” 
But the  trial judge did err when he found the police 
officer did not have any basis for suspecting  the 
accused had alcohol in his body when the ASD 
demand was made. In Justice Whitmore’s opinion, 
the trial judge appeared to have mistaken the 
evidence of the accused’s admission that he had 
consumed alcohol with the evidence as to when he 
had consumed his last drink:
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
ASD Demand
“[T]he requirements for a valid s. 254
(2)(b) demand essentially are that:
(i) the police officer must subjectively (or honestly) 
suspect the detained driver has alcohol in his or her 
body; and
(ii) the police officer’s subjective suspicion must be 
based on a constellation of objectively verifiable 
circumstances, which collectively indicate that 
the suspicion that the detained driver has alcohol 
in his or her body is reasonable. “
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal Justice Klebuc in R. v. Yates, 2014 
SKCA 52 at para. 33.  
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The evidence of the police officer, the evidence 
of the [accused], and the evidence at the voir 
dire were consistent and clear that the police 
officer asked the [accused] if he had been 
drinking, which the [accused] (while he was still 
in his own vehicle) admitted and this admission 
was before the ASD demand was made. 
However, the police officer and the [accused] 
were both unsure whether the police officer 
asked the [accused] when he had consumed his 
last drink—before or after the ASD demand was 
made ... . [para. 12]
The appeal judge’s findings were correct in result 
and the accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Sword, 2013 SKPC 43 and R. v. Sword, 2015 SKQB 9.
  
MAN	 PURSE	 SEARCH	 
REASONABLE:	 LOADED	 
HANDGUN	 ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Sheck, 2015 BCCA 471
After a man survived a shooting 
outside his residence, the police 
received information on three 
occasions from a  confidential source 
that the accused was actively 
pursuing  a plot to murder the man. The informer also 
said that the accused was regularly carrying  a  9mm 
Glock handgun in a Louis Vuitton shoulder satchel 
or man purse. Both the man and the  accused had 
been warned of the threat of harm each faced from 
the other. About four months after the shooting, 
police surveilled the accused to a restaurant that he 
entered carrying  a man purse. The purpose of the 
surveillance was to corroborate or refute the source 
information and to obtain lifestyle information on 
him. The goal was not to take him into custody but 
to detain and check him. The police, members of the 
Integrated Gang  Task Force, planned to enter the 
restaurant and make it look like  a random licensed 
premise check. They would ID the accused and ask 
him to step outside  without being  Chartered or 
warned inside the restaurant. 
 
When the police entered the restaurant, they noted 
the accused was sitting  alone in a booth. He was 
asked for his identification, which he provided. After 
his ID was checked, the accused was asked to 
accompany police outside. He complied, putting  his 
man purse over his shoulder as he left with the 
officer. Outside the restaurant the officer told the 
accused he was going  to be searched for officer 
safety. He took the man purse and searched it, 
finding  a loaded Glock 9mm handgun. He was 
arrested for possessing  the handgun, handcuffed and 
advised of his s. 10(b) Charter  rights. He said he 
wanted to speak to counsel of his choice but was not 
provided with an opportunity to do so until back at 
the police station some 80 minutes after the  initial 
detention. The accused’s cell phone was also 
searched as was his rental vehicle parked in the 
restaurant's parking  lot. He was charged with 
possessing a loaded prohibited weapon. 
BC Provincial Court
The arresting  officer testified that he 
believed he detained the accused when 
he made contact with him in the booth, 
but he did not advise  him that he was 
detained due to safety concerns. He wanted to get 
the accused outside of the restaurant as soon as 
possible for the safety of the public.
The accused argued that his rights under ss. 8, 9 and 
10 of the  Charter had been breached. In his view, 
the searches of his person, cell phone and motor 
vehicle were  unreasonable, his detention was 
arbitrary, and the police failed to advise him of the 
reasons for and the right to counsel upon detention. 
The judge concluded that the  police undertook a 
valid investigative detention. They were investigating 
a conspiracy  to commit murder and had relatively 
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specific information that the accused was regularly 
carrying  a Glock firearm inside a Louis Vuitton man 
purse bag. “The police had the subjective belief in 
the presence of a firearm,” said the judge. “The 
police actions, the rapid tempo of their activity and 
the manpower assigned to tasks in the short time 
frame, all confirm the legitimate subjective beliefs of 
the police investigators that they were confronting 
near exigent circumstances.” He found the police 
actions inside the restaurant were a deliberate and 
planned form of deception, set in place to reduce 
the risk of harm to the public and the police:
I find this strategy created an investigatory 
detention of the accused for a period of about 
two minutes or less to accomplish the goal of the 
investigators, seize the suspected firearm and 
disrupt a conspiracy to commit murder. The 
search went beyond a pat down of the accused 
to include the seizure and opening of the bag 
hanging from a strap on his shoulder. These 
actions were done without exercising physical 
force on the accused. [The accused] had not 
given his informed consent to any form of 
search. The police did not engage in publicly 
humiliating or degrading actions in their dealing 
with the accused while under detention or 
subsequent arrest. The manner of the search of 
his person and the bag did not involve any 
gratuitous intrusions into areas of bodily 
integrity. They were deliberately low key and 
calm in their contact with the accused during 
this investigatory detention phase. There were 
limited objective bases for the reasonable 
suspicion regarding possession of the firearm in 
the bag.”
The judge also found the search of the bag  to be 
reasonable:
[G]iven the heightened scale of the risk to the 
public, the genuine subjective views of the 
police, the investigative context and their 
measured and restrained tactics in effecting a 
physical detention of the accused, I find that the 
search of the bag fits within the ambit of the 
permissible range of intrusion for searches to 
ensure public and officer safety during 
investigative detention.
The searches of the accused’s cell phone and car 
were, however, conceded to be unreasonable by the 
Crown. The Crown also conceded breaches under 
both ss. 10(a) and (b). The accused was detained in 
the restaurant but not advised of the detention until 
minutes later outside the restaurant. As well, there 
was  a delay in providing  access to counsel for more 
than 80 minutes after the detention and arrest. The 
handgun, however, was nevertheless admitted as 
evidence under s. 24(2) despite  the s. 10 breaches 
and the s. 8  breaches related to the cell phone and 
rental car searches.
BC Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the test 
for a proper search pursuant to an 
investigative detention had been 
changed by  the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3. He 
suggested that now there must be “reasonable 
grounds to believe” (not the lesser “reasonable 
suspicionˮ standard)  of an imminent threat to safety 
and that the search was necessary  to address that 
threat. He contended there was no objectively 
verifiable support for the investigative detention, but 
it was instead a search for evidence and the licensed 
premises check was but a ruse to put police in the 
position to carry the search out.
Investigative Detention
Chief Justice Bauman, authoring  the Appeal Court’s 
opinion, reviewed the case law on investigative 
detention as it has developed since R. v. Mann, 2004 
SCC 52. He noted that there is a limited police 
power to detain for investigation where the officer’s 
reasonable suspicion is supported by way of 
objective reasonable grounds that “there is a clear 
nexus between the individual to be detained and a 
recent or on-going  criminal offenceˮ. A search 
incidental to an investigative detention is also 
authorized by the common law provided it is 
premised on reasonable grounds to believe that 
one's safety or that of others is “at riskˮ. Further, a 
search incident to investigative detention can, in 
some cases, go beyond a pat down to include a 
search of fanny packs, for example. 
Noting  R. v. MacDonald did not deal with a search 
incidental to an investigative detention, but a  so-
called “free-standingˮ safety search, the Court of 
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Appeal found it unnecessary to decide whether the 
Supreme Court re-calibrated the standard that is to 
be applied in determining  the lawfulness of a safety 
search incidental to an investigative detention such 
that the test is now more stringent. Because, in this 
case, the higher standard had been met anyway. The 
police had the subjective belief in the presence of a 
firearm. Second, the police had an objectively 
verifiable basis for their subjective belief. This was 
not a  sham investigative detention masking  a bald 
search for evidence as submitted by the  accused. 
“The ‘ruse’ simply allowed the police to escort [the 
accused] safely  out of the Earl's Restaurant; it was 
not the  basis for the detention,” said Chief Justice 
Bauman. “The totality  of the circumstances founded 
a legitimate investigative detention.” There were no 
ss. 8 or 9 Charter  breaches in the accused’s 
detention and safety search.
As for the trial judge’s s. 24(2)  analysis, assuming 
there  were Charter breaches as conceded by Crown, 
he did not err in finding  the evidence admissible. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ENTRY	 FOLLOWING	 
DISCONNECTED	 911	 CALL	 
LAWFUL
R. v. Zarama, 2015 ONCA 860
Two police officers responded to a 
disconnected 911 call in the middle 
of the night. No one said anything. 
When the police attended the home 
from where  the call originated, the 
accused’s parents invited the police  inside and said 
their daughter probably made the call. She lived 
with her parents, suffered from mental health 
challenges and had not been taking  her medication. 
The parents said the officers would need to speak 
with the accused to determine why she called and 
whether she required any help. She was in her 
bedroom, yelling, and would not open her locked 
bedroom door.
After the accused’s mother picked the lock on the 
bedroom door, the police entered it. The accused 
was lying  on her bed holding  a serrated kitchen 
knife. She got up and walked towards the officers 
yelling, “You want this? You want this?” The officers 
drew their guns and yelled at the accused to drop 
the knife. The accused moved towards her mother 
and one of the officers. The officer then dove at the 
accused and attempted to wrestle the knife  from her. 
She resisted, cutting  the officer’s lip and scratching 
the back of his ear and neck.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused was convicted of aggravated 
assault and assault with a weapon but 
was later found to be not criminally 
responsible.    
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed the findings 
of guilt. She argued that the 
officers were trespassing  when 
they entered her bedroom and she 
was therefore justified in repelling  them. The Court 
of Appeal, however, rejected this argument:
In our view, the police officers were acting 
reasonably, and within the scope of their duties, 
in responding  to a disconnected 911 call.  
Therefore, they were never trespassing.
The officers were entitled to assume that the 
[accused], as the maker of the 911 call, was in 
distress.  They were also entitled to physically 
locate the [accused] within the home so that 
they could determine her reasons for making the 
call and provide such assistance as might be 
required. This is so despite the assurances of the 
[accused’s] parents that she was not in need of 
aid.  Consequently, as the [accused] refused to 
leave her bedroom, the officers had the right to 
enter it because there was no other reasonable 
alternative for ensuring  that she would receive 
any needed assistance in a timely manner.  
[reference omitted, paras. 8-9]
Furthermore, the accused's use of force was not 
reasonable in the circumstances given what 
transpired in the bedroom. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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RCMP STATISTICS
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. It is divided into 15 Divisions 
with Headquarters in Ottawa. Each 
division is managed by a commanding 
officer and is designated alphabetically. 
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of September 1, 2015
Rank #	 of	 positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 7
Assistant Commissioners 26
Chief Superintendents 58
Superintendents 179
Inspectors 348
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 1
Staff Sergeants Major 13
Staff Sergeants 812
Sergeants 1,923
Corporals 3,377
Constables 11,491
Special Constables 55
Civilian Members 3,838
Public Servants 6,331
Total 28,461
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
RCMP DIVISIONS
Division Area
Depot Regina, SK (Training Academy)
National National Capital Region
B Newfoundland & Labrador
C Quebec
D Manitoba
E British Columbia
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
K Alberta
L Prince Edward Island
M Yukon Territory
O Ontario
V Nunavut Territory
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SURVEILLANCE	 CORROBORATES	 
INFORMERS’	 TIPS
R. v. Bediako, 2015 ONCA 788
Police received specific and current 
information from three confidential 
informants (A,B,C)  concerning  the 
particular location and movements of 
individuals and a detailed physical 
description of them. The information suggested that 
two men (one who turned out to be the accused) 
were selling  crack cocaine from “Beard’s” place. The 
information also said the men carried guns. Given 
the similarity in A and B’s information, the  police 
confirmed they were not the  same person. As well, 
some of the information provided by the confidential 
informers was already known to the police  from 
previous investigations. The police also attempted to 
corroborate the information received through earlier 
surveillance and a review of police databases. 
The police then independently corroborated 
important details of the information through further 
surveillance. They observed various individuals 
coming  and going  in the area of “Beard’s place”. 
They waited until they noted a  taxicab  pull into the 
alley behind the building  at 11:04 pm and saw a 
black male (the accused) and a white male (his 
associate), roughly  matching  the descriptions 
provided by the confidential informants, enter the 
taxi and then leave. When the police saw the taxi 
travel west, confirming  the information that “Leo” 
and “Shane” resided in the west part of Windsor, the 
police conducted a high risk take down and arrested 
the accused and his associate. When the accused 
was searched at the roadside, the police discovered 
that he had a  loaded .40 calibre Smith and Wesson 
handgun tucked into his belt and that he was 
wearing a bulletproof vest.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that the loaded 
firearm was obtained as a  result of ss. 7, 
8  and 9 Charter breaches from his arrest 
and the subsequent warrantless search 
incident to that arrest. The judge considered whether 
the police  subjectively believed that they had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
accused for possession of a firearm, and whether 
those grounds were objectively reasonable in the 
totality  of the circumstances. He examined the 
strengths and weaknesses of the information 
provided by the confidential informers and of the 
confidential informers themselves. Considering  the 
totality  of the  circumstances, the judge found the 
THE INFORMERS
Informer A was described as 
reliable and confirmed.  A was 
involved in the drug subculture, had 
no convictions for perjury or 
misleading police, and had provided 
assistance to the police in the past 
that had resulted in the execution 
of search warrants, arrests, and seizures.  A said that 
two individuals named “Leo” and “Shane” were selling 
crack cocaine at “Beard’s place”. Beard was a drug user 
whose name, address and uniquely bullet-ridden door 
were previously known to the police; “Leo” and “Shane” 
were always wearing bullet proof vests and carrying 
guns; they were staying in the west end of Windsor; 
“Shane” was described as a black male, 25 years of age, 
170 pounds, 5’ 10” tall, with a scruffy beard and short 
black hair.
Informer B was described as 
reliable and confirmed. B was 
known by his handler for a number 
of years, had no convictions for 
perjury or misleading the police, 
and had provided information that 
previously resulted in CDSA 
warrants, arrests, and charges being laid with drugs 
being seized. B said “Leo” and “Shane” were selling 
drugs from “Beard’s place”, “Leo” and “Shane” had both 
been seen with vests and guns. B provided a physical 
description of “Shane”. B knew “Leo” and “Shane” and 
further provided the description of “Leo” as an Iraqi 
male, 24 years of age, 6 feet tall, 250 pounds. 
Informer C said “Leo”, also 
known as “Abdul”, was of Iraqi 
background, of youthful 
appearance, about 19 years of age, 
and 6 feet tall. C advised that “Leo” 
was selling cocaine from “Beard’s 
place”. C also related the unusual, 
specific detail that “Leo” took a taxicab to and from 
Beard’s place from his residence which was located in a 
westerly direction.
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confidential informants and their information to be 
compelling, credible and corroborated. The judge 
also concluded that the police did not act 
prematurely in arresting  the two men in the taxi cab. 
The danger to the public and the police  due to the 
likely presence of firearms justified the arrest and the 
subsequent warrantless search of the accused 
incident to his arrest. There were no Charter 
breaches and, even if there  were, the gun was 
admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted on three charges related to possessing  an 
unauthorized, prohibited firearm and cartridge 
magazine. He was sentenced to four years in prison 
less credit for time served.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
police acted prematurely on 
dated, generic information and 
that they failed to take any steps to 
corroborate the confidential informers’ information. 
Thus, in his view, the trial judge erred in finding  that 
the police objectively had reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest and search him. The Court of 
Appeal, however, found the police  did not arbitrarily 
or precipitately  arrest the men. Rather, they waited 
until police surveillance confirmed important 
identifying  details provided by the three confidential 
informers. The Court of Appeal stated:
 
The trial judge properly viewed the evidence of 
the grounds for arrest in the context of the 
dynamics of an urgent situation likely involving 
firearms. He correctly concluded that in these 
circumstances, based on the information that the 
police had received and the surveillance which 
confirmed some material details about the 
[accused], his associate, and their activities, the 
police had objectively reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] and his associate 
and then to search the [accused] incident to his 
arrest. [para. 19]
The Court of Appeal also found the trial judge’s s. 24
(2)  analysis was proper if there had been a Charter 
breach. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CORROBORATED	 COMPELLING	 
INFO	 FROM	 CREDIBLE	 SOURCE	 
JUSTIFIES	 ARREST	 &	 SEARCH
R. v. Nguyen, 2015 ONCA 753
The police received information from 
a carded confidential informer. This 
informer had no criminal record and 
had previously provided information 
on two previous occasions that 
resulted in drug-related arrests. An Asian female told 
the informer that she had marijuana for sale. The 
Asian female then drove her silver Dodge Caravan 
with the licence plate BBTT 163 to a  home on Epson 
Downs Road. She keyed her way into the front door, 
went into the house and returned promptly with 
marijuana, green in colour. The Asian female said 
that she had lots more marijuana if the informer was 
interested. The informer then left the home.
The police conducted surveillance on a  Vietnamese 
female they saw leave the  Epson Downs Road home 
described by the informer. She entered a Dodge 
Caravan, licence plate  BBTT 163, and was followed 
to another home on Clair Road. She exited her van 
and momentarily entered this house while  carrying  a 
yellow shopping  bag. She then exited the house 
empty handed, got back into her van, and drove to a 
third residence on Autumn Hill. She touched 
something  on the van’s visor, the garage door 
opened and she got out of her van. She retrieved a 
recycling  bin and placed it in the garage. She then 
opened the  van’s back hatch, retrieved a black gym 
bag, and took it into the garage. She then drove back 
to the Clair Road home and took two large waste 
paper bags that seemed full from another female 
who arrived in a  different vehicle. The accused 
placed these bags in her van and drove away. She 
was stopped by police and arrested. Her van was 
searched incident to arrest and police found 11.48 
kgs of marihuana in bags. 
The police ran the accused on CPIC and found she 
had been convicted six months earlier for possessing 
6.9 kilograms of marijuana. Police  also obtained a 
warrant to search the three homes the accused 
visited while under surveillance. In the accused’s 
home on Autumn Hill, police found 13.5 kgs of 
marihuana and 733  grms. of ketamine. She was 
charged with drug offences. 
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that her arrest and the 
subsequent searches violated her ss. 8 and 
9 Charter rights and the  drugs should be 
excluded as evidence under s. 24(2). The 
judge, however, found the information provided by 
the informer, coupled with subsequent police 
surveillance, provided objectively  reasonable and 
probable grounds for the accused’s arrest. The 
informer was a reliable and accurate source of 
information. The information provided was detailed 
and was materially corroborated by subsequent 
police surveillance. As for the search warrant, the 
judge found it was credibly probable that the 
accused was storing  marihuana in one or more of 
the three homes she was connected to. She  was 
convicted on three counts of possessing  drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking  and sentenced to a  term of 
imprisonment of two years less three days, followed 
by three years of probation.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appea led he r 
convictions submitting  that the 
police did not have objectively 
reasonable and probable grounds 
for her arrest. She also contended that the  search 
warrant for her Autumn Hill home should not have 
been issued because there was no basis to support 
the inference that drugs were being stored at it.
The Arrest
The Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge did not err in 
concluding  reasonable  grounds 
existed for the arrest. “An arresting  officer must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable grounds 
to make an arrest and those grounds must be 
objectively justifiable,” said the Court. Here, the 
accused did not challenge the  arresting  officer’s 
subjective belief that she was in possession of drugs. 
Instead, she submitted that the officer’s grounds for 
arrest were not objectively justifiable on the totality 
of the circumstances. The  Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed. The source was credible, the tip  was 
compelling, and the information was corroborated 
by police investigation. 
Credible source 
“The informant was not an anonymous tipster or an 
untested source,” said the Court of Appeal. It 
continued:
The informant was known to and carded by 
police and had no criminal record. As the 
[accused] acknowledges, on two previous 
occasions the informant had provided 
information resulting in drug-related arrests.
Whether or not convictions had yet ensued as a 
result of those drug-related arrests does not 
detract from the reliability of the informant. 
Considerable time often elapses between an 
arrest and trial and, in any event, an arrest and 
seizure of drugs may not result in a conviction 
for any number of reasons unrelated to the 
reliability of the informant.
And, just because the police spoke to the  known 
and tested informer by telephone and could not 
observe their demeanor did not diminish the 
credibility of the tip. 
Compelling Information
Although the trial judge did not use the word 
“compelling” to describe the information provided 
by the informer, it was compelling. “The information 
was derived from the informant’s direct interaction 
with the [accused],” said the Court of Appeal:
It was far from bald conclusory statements or 
mere rumour or gossip. The combination of the 
vehicle description, complete with licence plate, 
the specific address where the target sold the 
informant mari juana and the physical 
description of the target was highly compelling.
While the date the police received the tip and 
the date the informant met with the target were 
redacted from the Information to Obtain Search 
Warrant (“ITO”), the compelling  nature of the 
information that was disclosed, coupled with the 
“An arresting officer must subjectively 
have reasonable and probable grounds 
to make an arrest and those grounds 
must be objectively justifiable.”
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subsequent police surveillance, addressed any 
concerns arising from the absence of this 
information. [references omitted, paras. 19-20]
Corroboration
The informer’s tip was materially corroborated by 
subsequent police surveillance before the accused 
was arrested.  
House Search
The search warrant for the  accused’s house was also 
upheld. The informer’s information, police 
surveillance, the accused’s arrest and the CPIC 
search results amply supported the officer’s belief 
that marihuana would be found:
The [accused] was engaged in transactions 
involving  large quantities of marijuana. She was 
observed leaving a yellow shopping  bag  at the 
Clair Road residence. She was later observed at 
the same residence picking up two large yard 
waste bags of what was confirmed to be 
marijuana. Another plastic bag containing 
marijuana was also found in the Dodge Caravan 
when she was arrested. In between her trips to 
the Clair Road residence, she was observed 
removing a black gym bag  from the Dodge 
Caravan and taking  it into the Autumn Hill 
residence, which appeared (and proved) to be 
her home.
It was a reasonable inference that drugs would 
be found at the Autumn Hill residence. That 
inference arises from the deposit of the gym bag 
at the Autumn Hill residence (whether or not it 
was done “quickly”); the large quantities of 
marijuana involved, which necessitated the 
storage of the drugs; and the evidence that the 
[accused] had access to that residence. The 
information from the informant that there had 
been drugs at the Epson Downs residence does 
not make the inference that there were drugs at 
the Autumn Hill residence unreasonable. Drugs 
can be stored at more than one location. [paras. 
35-36]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
EXIGENT	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 
JUSTIFIED	 ENTRY	 INTO	 HOME
R. v. Kim, 2015 ABCA 274
 
Police received information from a 
registered, paid, and known to be 
reliable  confidential informer that a 
Cambodian man connected to a 
Calgary gang  going  by  the initials TJ 
was moving  significant quantities of cocaine from 
Calgary to Brooks to be sold there. The informer also 
provided a description of TJ’s motor vehicle and his 
home address, as well as information that TJ had 
recently been released from prison and was on 
parole having  served a sentence for drug  trafficking. 
That and other information provided by the informer 
was investigated and much of it was confirmed. It 
led police to the accused, who fit the information 
the informer had provided. The police began to 
surveil the accused and observed him conduct 
transactions commonly engaged in by drug 
traffickers selling  drugs. The police then arrested the 
accused and two friends outside a restaurant in 
Brooks. One of the accused’s friends left seven rocks 
of cocaine wrapped in cellophane on the seat of the 
police car he was placed in after his arrest. The 
accused was also searched, but no contraband was 
found on him. 
Immediately following  the arrests, an investigator 
went to the accused’s home to maintain continuity 
of it pending  the authorization of a warrant to search 
his residence. Shortly  thereafter, the officer in charge 
of the investigation also arrived at the  accused’s 
home. Although there were lights on inside the 
house, there was no movement and police were 
Coming October 21, 2016 
www.characterabbotsford.com
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unable to determine if it was occupied. Fearing  that 
the public arrest of the accused might prompt a 
cohort to call the house and alert an occupant to 
destroy evidence, the officer went to the  door and 
knocked. When no one answered, the police forced 
open the door. They conducted a cursory  search of 
the home only to see if it was occupied, but it was 
not. During  their walk-through of the  home, the 
police saw a drug  scale and a large amount of cash 
in plain view in the  bedroom. The police left and 
waited outside for a search warrant, which was in 
the process of being  prepared. The search warrant 
was authorized the following  morning  and police re-
entered the home and searched it. They found six 
ounces of cocaine and rock cocaine along  with 
$4,000 in cash. The accused was charged with 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing proceeds of crime.
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge found the accused’s arrest was 
lawful. The information received from the 
confidential informer, along  with police 
surveillance which indicated activity 
consistent with drug  trafficking, provided a basis 
upon which to arrest him. The entry into the home 
was held to be reasonable. The judge accepted the 
circumstances confronting  the police were  exigent. 
This allowed the  police to enter the home under s. 
11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) without a warrant. The judge found no 
Charter breaches. 
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
things, that his rights under the 
Charter were violated. First, he 
contended that the police did not 
have reasonable grounds to arrest him; therefore the 
arrest was unlawful. In his view, a reasonable person 
not infused with the bias of the investigating  officers 
would not conclude that he was trafficking  drugs 
based on the observations. Second, he contended 
that his right to be  free from unreasonable search 
and seizure were violated as a  result of the 
warrantless entry into his home.  
Arrest
The Court of Appeal upheld 
the trial judge’s finding  that 
reasonable grounds existed 
on which to justify the arrest:
The information provided by the informant was 
detailed and much of it was corroborated by the 
police before they began their surveillance of the 
[accused]. That surveillance allowed them to 
observe the [accused] drive his vehicle to a 
darkened area behind a gas station, where a 
man entered his vehicle for approximately 30 
seconds, then left. The police testified that this 
conduct is consistent with the manner in which 
drug traffickers sell drugs. The [accused] submits 
it may also be consistent with other, completely 
innocent, activity. That is so, but the [accused] 
did not testify and accordingly the trial judge 
was left to draw the inference he chose; to find 
that this was drug  trafficking  activity. We cannot 
say he erred in so doing. That finding  alone 
would have allowed the police to arrest the 
[accused]. However, they continued their 
surveillance and watched while the [accused] 
and his friends were in a restaurant. There the 
police again observed the three men engage in 
conduct they thought indicative of drug 
trafficking. It ended when friends of the 
[accused] were seen leaving the restaurant 
apparently to conduct a sale in the parking  lot. 
[para. 9]
The accused’s arrest was therefore lawful. 
The Search - Exigent Circumstances
While recognizing  this case was a “close call”, the 
Court of Appeal found that the trial judge’s decision 
that the police entry  into the accused’s residence 
was motivated by exigent circumstances was not 
unreasonable. The police feared an occupant may 
have been alerted to the accused’s arrest and asked 
to destroy evidence. The Court stated:
The common law allows that when faced with 
exigent circumstances a police officer may 
engage in conduct that otherwise would require 
judicial authorization to be lawful, in order to 
avoid imminent danger to the officer or another, 
or to preserve evidence that may otherwise be 
destroyed. [references omitted, para. 13] 
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As well, s. 11(7) of the CDSA allows the police to 
forgo obtaining  a search warrant under s. 11(1) in 
cases of exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeal 
described the analysis as follows:
The invocation of this two pronged test is straight 
forward:
I. Did conditions for obtaining  a search 
warrant exist? If so,
II. Did exigent circumstances make it 
impractical to wait until a search warrant 
could be obtained? [para. 15]
The Court also noted that the reasonable belief of 
the police was the governing factor:
In assessing the police officer’s actions said to 
have been motivated by exigent circumstances, 
the court will need to be satisfied that the officer 
had the subjective belief that immediate action 
was required to secure and protect evidence, 
and that that belief was reasonably held. 
[reference omitted, para. 19]
In this case, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
did not err in concluding  exigent circumstances 
existed. 
Police Created Exigencies
The accused a l so submi t ted tha t , i f the 
circumstances were exigent, the  police created the 
exigencies and should not be permitted to benefit 
from their existence. He contended that the police 
should have obtained a search warrant before 
arresting  him and thus would have avoided the 
exigencies altogether. The Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed. “It is not practical to mandate standard 
investigative protocols of the kind sought here,” said 
the Court. “Many police investigations are dynamic 
and unpredictable and judicially  mandated 
protocols cannot take into account the nuances of 
every investigation. The better course will be to 
consider the circumstances confronting  the police 
when the decisions are made and to deny claims of 
exigent circumstances if police conduct is found to 
have created them in order to circumvent an 
accused’s Charter rights.” In this case, the trial judge 
“The common law allows that when faced 
with exigent circumstances a police 
officer may engage in conduct that 
otherwise would require judicial 
authorization to be lawful, in order to 
avoid imminent danger to the officer or 
another, or to preserve evidence that may 
otherwise be destroyed.”
THE EXIGENCIES
“The circumstances facing the police when they decided 
a warrantless entry into the accused’s home was 
justified to preserve evidence were these.
i. much of the information provided by the 
confidential informant regarding the [accused] had 
been confirmed and the police believed the 
informant to be reliable.
ii. surveillance of the [accused’s] residence began at 
5:30 p.m. February 2nd, 2011. At approximately 
7:23 p.m. the [accused] and another male were 
observed to leave the residence.
iii. there were not enough officers to maintain 
surveillance of both the [accused] and his 
residence.
iv. in the course of their surveillance of the [accused] 
the police observed activity which to them 
indicated the [accused] and his companions 
engaged in two drug sales within the ensuing 
ninety minutes.
v. the [accused] and two friends were arrested 
outside a Boston Pizza in Brooks, Alberta at 
approximately 9:00 p.m. February 2nd, 2011.
vi. just prior to their arrest they had been in the 
company of other persons who were not arrested 
or detained.
vii.  immediately following the arrests a police officer 
was dispatched to maintain continuity in the 
[accused’s] home. Other officers soon joined him.
viii. on returning to the [accused’s] residence the 
officers could see no movement inside the house 
but noted that the interior lights were on.
ix. fearing the home may be occupied and that 
someone who had witnessed the arrests would 
call the occupant to destroy evidence, the police 
went to the door and knocked. No one 
answered.” [para. 20]
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made no such finding  that the police  created the 
exigencies nor was it raised at trial by the accused.  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
URGENCY	 NOT	 A	 FACTOR	 IN	 
TELEWARRANT	 APPLICATION
R. v. Clark, 2015 BCCA 488
A police officer detected an odour of 
fresh growing  marihuana coming 
from a residence and noticed 
condensation on some of the 
windows. He returned to the area 
several times and also conducted some surveillance. 
He saw the accused leave the residence and 
approached him in a nearby parking  lot under the 
ruse of talking  to him about shoplifting  activities in 
the area. The accused identified himself, provided 
his date of birth, and stated he lived at the residence 
(the officer was investigating). A computer check 
revealed the accused had a criminal record that 
included drug-related convictions, two of which 
were for producing  a  controlled substance. The 
officer also received information from a BC Hydro 
security employee that a service check determined 
that a substantial amount of electricity was currently 
being stolen at the residence. 
The officer completed an Information to Obtain 
(ITO) at 2:00 am for a  telewarrant application to 
investigate theft of electricity at the residence. The 
officer was seeking  a warrant to search “by day.” In 
the application the officer stated he was using  the 
telewarrant procedure as it was impracticable for 
him to appear personally before a  justice because he 
was working  a  nightshift in the early morning  hours 
and the courthouse was presently closed. After 
leaving  a message through the Justice Centre phone 
line, the officer received a call from a Judicial Justice 
(JJ)  at 2:10 am asking  him why the application could 
not be made in person during  the day  at the 
courthouse. He provided several points and the JJ 
suggested those reasons be set out in the ITO. The 
officer revised his ITO and he faxed the completed 
application to the  JJ at 2:35 am. At 3:07 am the 
officer received a signed telewarrant authorizing  him 
(and other officers) to enter the residence between 
2:00 pm and 6:00 pm to search for evidence of 
electricity theft (ie. the Hydro Meter, the equipment 
used to divert the electricity, and any documents 
identifying  the owner and/or occupants of the 
residence).
When the police executed the warrant, they not only 
found an electrical by-pass but also a large 
marihuana grow-operation. The police seized 707 
marihuana plants, grow-operation equipment, 
evidence of the bypass, $500 cash and two gold 
rings believed to be  offence-related property. The 
accused was found inside the home at the time the 
warrant was executed. He was charged with 
producing  marihuana, possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused suggested that the warrant 
was invalid, in part, because the JJ had 
acted inappropriately by providing 
advice to the officer in the  preparation of 
the ITO.  In the judge’s view, the JJ was not acting 
judicially when he guided the officer in the 
telewarrant application. He found the JJ was 
predisposed to grant the application he had not yet 
seen. The judge excised the  paragraph from the ITO 
that addressed the impracticability of an in-person 
application. Without this, the impracticability 
requirement of the telewarrant provision had not 
been satisfied. The warrant was quashed and the 
search of the residence amounted to a warrantless 
one. The accused’s s. 8  rights had been breached 
“In assessing the police officer’s actions 
said to have been motivated by exigent 
circumstances, the court will need to be 
satisfied that the officer had the 
subjective belief that immediate action 
was required to secure and protect 
evidence, and that that belief was 
reasonably held.”
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and the evidence of the drugs and other items was 
excluded under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted 
of all charges. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling  suggesting  he  erred 
in finding  that the JJ gave 
improper assistance to the officer 
submitting  the telewarrant. As well, the Crown 
argued that the judge erred in ruling  the evidence 
inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
Judicial Independence & Impartiality
Justice Frankel, speaking  for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found the trial judge’s inference that the JJ 
was predisposed to grant the warrant even before he 
saw it was neither reasonable nor logical. In some 
cases, “it is permissible for a judicial justice to 
provide some advice and/or direction to an officer 
applying  for a warrant.” Regarding  this case, Justice 
Frankel stated:
It is apparent that JJ Cyr was on-call at two 
o’clock in the morning because the Justice 
Centre was closed. The inquiry he made of [the 
officer]—in effect, “why can’t this wait until 
normal office hours”—is something any judicial 
justice or judge likely would ask at that time of 
day. More importantly, the suggestion made by JJ 
Cyr to [the officer] was in keeping with what the 
Supreme Court of Canada has said about how 
judicial justices should carry out their 
duties. Impracticability was one of the matters JJ 
Cyr would have to consider once he received 
the ITO. He did no more than advise [the officer] 
fully set out his reasons for using  the telewarrant 
procedure. Whether those reasons were 
sufficient was something JJ Cyr had yet to 
consider.
In Hunter v. Southam Inc. ..., the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that s. 8  of the Charter requires 
search-warrant applications to be determined by 
persons who are neutral, impartial, and capable 
of acting  judicially. Judicial justices are 
presumed to be such persons. On the evidence, 
it was neither logical nor reasonable to find, by 
inference, that the presumption of judicial 
impartiality had been displaced.   Put otherwise, 
there was no basis on which to find JJ Cyr acted 
other than in keeping  with his office. [paras. 
60-61]
The trial judge, therefore, erred in excising  the 
paragraph addressing impracticability from the ITO.
Impracticability
The accused argued that even considering  the 
paragraph explaining  why the officer did not appear 
in-person, the impracticability requirement was still 
not met. In his opinion, there  was no urgency for 
obtaining  a warrant in the  early morning  hours and 
there  was no explanation from the officer why he 
could not wait until the courthouse opened later that 
day. But Justice  Frankel rejected this submission. The 
ITO need only support a basis why an in-person 
application is not practicable. It is not necessary to 
also show that urgency is a factor:
I do not agree with [the accused] that to meet 
the impracticability requirement the facts set out 
in an ITO must satisfy a judicial justice not only 
that an in-person appearance is not feasible but 
also that there is an immediate need for a 
warrant.
“The telewarrant procedure was designed to make it possible for law enforcement 
officers to apply for a search warrant 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  Whether the 
application is made in-person or by fax the reasonable-grounds standard must be met 
before a warrant can be issued. The impracticability-requirement is concerned with 
whether it is practicable to make an in-person application at the time the application is 
brought; it does not require that an immediate need for a warrant be demonstrated.” 
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The telewarrant procedure was designed to 
make it possible for law enforcement officers to 
apply for a search warrant 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week.  Whether the application is made 
in-person or by fax the reasonable-grounds 
standard must be met before a warrant can be 
issued.  The impracticability-requirement is 
concerned with whether it is practicable to make 
an in-person application at the time the 
application is brought; it does not require that an 
i m m e d i a t e n e e d f o r a w a r r a n t b e 
demonstrated. [paras. 65-66]
I n t h i s c a s e , t h e p a ra g ra p h a d d r e s s i n g 
impracticability could have satisfied a JJ that the ITO 
disclosed “reasonable grounds for dispensing  with 
an information presented personally and in writing”. 
Furthermore, even without this paragraph, a JJ could 
have been satisfied that an in-person application was 
impracticable with the statement printed on the 
form. It stated that “the Kelowna Court House is 
presently  closed.” Although brief, the  statement was 
completely accurate:
There was no need for [the officer] to call the 
Kelowna courthouse to enquire as to whether a 
judicial justice was available for an in-person 
application. That a judicial justice would not be 
available at two o’clock in the morning  is plain 
and obvious, even without reference to the Chief 
Judge’s practice direction.
On the basis of a statement in an ITO to the 
effect that the local courthouse is closed, a 
judicial justice could be satisfied that an in-
pe r son app l i ca t i on i s imp rac t i cab l e .  
Accordingly, given that the accuracy of the 
statement, “the Kelowna Court House is 
presently closed”, was not challenged on the 
voir dire, the trial judge erred in holding that the 
impracticability requirement had not been met. 
[paras. 80-81]
The telewarrant was properly issued. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittals were 
set aside and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
of Canadians lived in homes with a 
smoke detector. This was the most 
commonly  repor ted t ype o f 
precautionary  measure taken by 
Canadians. 
of Canadians reported having  a 
wind-up or battery operated radio in 
their homes. Forty eight percent had 
an alternate  source of heat, 43% 
kept and alternate source of water and 23% had a 
back-up generator.
The province where emergency planning  activities 
were most common. In BC, 53% of individuals 
resided in households that had engaged in a  high or 
moderately high level of emergency planning. 
Emergency planning  activities were less common in 
Quebec at 40%.
The number of ‘significant disaster 
events’ occurring  between 2000 to 
2014 according  to the Canadian 
Disaster Database. Disaster events 
included:
• Floods
• Wildfires
• Storms/thunderstorms
• Industrial or transportation accidents
• Winter storms
• Hurricanes/tropical storms
• Tornados
• Fires/explosions - non-residential
• Storm surges
• Outbreaks disease/serious illness
• Landslides/avalanches
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Emergency preparedness in Canada, 2014”, 
Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on October 28, 2015. 
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